"With the
Division fully reassembled, and holding
a critical sector of the Corps front,
the moment came when it was to undertake
its first all-Ozark offensive
operation—the drive to the Roer River in
the Linnich area.
On 25
November the Division’s sector extended
from a point 1,500 meters north of
Gereonsweiler to three hundred meters
south of Ederen. On the left the 405th
Infantry tied in with the 335th Infantry
of the 84th Division, and on the right
the 407th Infantry was in contact with
the 2d Armored Division. The boundaries
between the two regiments in the line
ran parallel to and immediately south of
the Gereonsweiler-Linnich road.
East from
Gereonsweiler and Ederen the ground
stretched flat and bare until it began
to shelve off to the river,
approximately 4,000 meters away. The
terrain in the area bounded by Lindern,
Ederen, Gereonsweiler, and Welz was a
flat tableland of fields, which at this
season of the year were bare of
vegetation and thoroughly soaked by the
November rains. The ground in the
Lindern—Gereonsweiler—Linnich triangle
sloped gently toward Linnich, starting
approximately 2,000 meters from the
town. Nowhere in the area was there much
cover for advancing troops, except for
an occasional very small rise or ridge.
A small
valley which extended from Ederen to
Welz and from there to Linnich broke the
evenness of the tableland in the sector
south of the Gereonsweiler-Linnich
road, but there was also very little
cover in that area. The valley, which
was lightly wooded, was virtually the
only irregularity of the terrain along
the Division’s front. The ground around
Flossdorf and Rurdorf was also
featureless except for another small
valley running out of Welz toward
Flossdorf. Welz, a dirty little farming
village, was located in the valley and
below the level of the flat land to its
east and west.
After it
moved up on 24 November, the 102d spent
the next few days getting ready for the
forthcoming attack. The front remained
fairly quiet, although enemy shellfire
was occasionally heavy. On 25 November
three tanks of the 771st Tank Battalion,
in support positions south of
Gereonsweiler, were knocked out by flak
guns from the outskirts of Linnich. The
Linnich water tower which enabled the
enemy to direct fire finally was shot
down by American artillery on 26
November.
The final
reorganization of the Division was set
for 28 November when for the first time
all its regiments would be under its
control. On the afternoon of 25
November, General Keating recommended to
XIII Corps that no action be taken by
the Division prior to its
reorganization. Later that night,
however, the Division was notified that
the attack had been set forward from 1
December to 29 November which allowed a
bare twenty-four hours in which to
prepare for the coming offensive.
The 405th
Infantry immediately began to relieve
the 335th, one battalion at a time, on
the night of 26 and 27 November.
Meanwhile, on 27 November, elements of
the 407th on the right of the regimental
sector moved forward approximately 200
yards to establish contact with the 2d
Armored Division in its attack that day.
In the afternoon, a small enemy
counterattack there was beaten off
without difficulty and elsewhere the
front remained relatively quiet.
PANZERS ON
THE FRONT
Opposing
the Division along the Roer River line
was the 10th SS Panzer Division and a
part of the 340th Volksgrenadier
Division, plus a scattering of other
troops. The 10th SS Panzer Division had
been clearly identified in the line by
the time the 102d launched its attack,
and it was learned later that it had
borne the brunt of the battle, employing
its 21st and 22d Panzergrenadier
Regiments and the 10th SS Reconnaissance
and Engineer Battalions. The
Volksgrenadier unit, which had committed
its 695th Regiment, was composed of a
miscellany of troops, including Poles,
disgruntled Luftwaffe personnel, overage
soldiers and advanced convalescents.
The
general morale of the Volksgrenadiers,
as opposed to that of the elite SS
troops, was low. However, after the
withdrawal of the SS units across the
river during 1 December, the last
defense of the sector was left to the
less valuable Volksgrenadiers. The
latter took a dim view of this situation
with the result that many gave
themselves up during the night of I
December or surrendered without a
struggle the next day.
Of the
Ozarks’ three regiments, the 407th was
in the best condition.
The 405th
had
suffered considerable losses while
attached to the 84th Division and had
had practically no time for rest. The
406th, after almost a month of fighting,
was likewise fatigued and slightly
under strength, although replacements
for earlier losses had previously been
received.
PLANS
In
conjunction with the offensive of the
84th Infantry Division on Lindern,
scheduled for 29 November, the 102nd
Division was to stage a limited
objective attack in the left portion of
its sector. Specifically it was to
maintain contact with the 84th as it
advanced, and to seize and cut the
Lindern—Linnich road which bisected the
high ground dominating Brachelen and
Linnich.
The
scheme of maneuver provided for the
405th Infantry, on the Division left, to
jump off from its frontline position,
maintain contact with the 84th Division
on its left, and seize the high ground
overlooking the river along the Lindern—Linnich
road.
As a
diversionary effect the 407th Infantry,
on the Division right, was to assist the
405th Infantry, maintain contact with
the 2d Armored Division on its right,
and seize the three towns along the Roer
River directly to its front. The 406th
Infantry, in Division reserve south of
Beggendorf, was ordered to prepare to
attack through either regiment to
capture the prescribed objectives or
repulse a counterattack should one
develop.
The
morning of 29 November broke cold and
chilly, with slight mist ‘and rain. Old
Man Mud predominated, and foxholes were
inches deep in water. All in all it was
miserable and the troops envied the
Germans in their modernly equipped and
well-protected troop shelters. Possibly
this had something to do with the spirit
they displayed—the determination to
complete the mission as quickly as
possible and become tenants in more
suitable quarters."
"
407TH
INFANTRY
The
attack by the 407th Infantry was, as
contemplated, little more than a long
rush. By 0830, Lt. Col. William
I.
Danskin,
Regimental Executive Officer, reported
that the regiment was on its objective
all along the line, and that the 2d
Armored Division was coming up on the
right. It then demonstrated by fire
during the remainder of the day as
directed. Although a few casualties were
suffered from artillery and small arms
fire, the enemy did not make his
expected counterattack. The ground
before Welz was now clear of the enemy
and the 407th was in a good position to
launch its attack on the Roer River
towns."
S/Sgt
Arembug was killed in de push for the
Roer River.
