Thursday, January 11, was one of the coldest
days that the 275th spent in the Vosges
Mountains, as the temperature hovered between
minus 13 and minus 6 degrees Fahrenheit. Shortly
after daybreak, the task force moved out, its
route paralleling the original left boundary of
the 275th, a boundary which was shifted to the
left that morning so as to include Hill 364 in
the 275th' s sector. The task force' s mission
was further expanded to not only support the
276th, but also to prevent the Germans from
using the east-west valley north of the
Schwarzenberg to slip in behind Company E on the
ridge just north of the valley.
Pfc Eldon McDermeit, 60mm mortar gunner,
would normally not have gone on such an
operation, but was assigned by 2nd Lt. Eric
Denton, Weapons Platoon leader. McDermeit had
been temporarily assigned to a rifle squad since
two of the five man members of his mortar squad
had been wounded and McDermeit's good friend,
Sgt. Mike Deasy, squad leader, had been killed
in the same foxhole with him only a few days
before by a tree-burst of an 88mm shell.
McDermeit and the other GIs had eaten their
usual K-ration breakfast then packed a second
ration, believing that they would be back by
evening. There was about six inches of snow on
the ground as they moved out, but it became
deeper as they moved higher into the hills. The
area was heavily wooded with few clearings.
Sgt. McCoy, acting 1 st Platoon leader, and
one of the oldest men in the outfit at nearly 34
years of age, recalled that the task force
started out with the 1st Platoon in the lead
moving parallel to the Obermuehlthal road along
the mountain side to the north of the road. The
slope was covered with 8-10 foot pines, their
boughs heavy with snow. The column arrived at a
point immediately above Obermuehlthal and turned
north following the contour around the nose of
the mountain. Then the force climbed onto a
saddle-back east of the Schwarzenberg I s peak.
From there it continued north following a trail
which gradually turned west along the lower
north slope of the mountain. The north side of
the mountain was, in places, bare of tree cover.
Then the trail bent sharply to circle around a
prominent spur which extended northeast from the
summit. Continuing along the trail, the column
had just turned west rounding the spine of the
spur when it began receiving shellfire. The
advance was halted and the men ordered to dig
in. Adding to the artillery was long-range small
arms fire from the northwest, from positions
across the valley. This was the situation about
noon.
Pfc Frank P. Collo, 1st Scout, from Staten
Island, New York, recalled being subjected to an
artillery barrage in an area of tall trees. The
men could hear the shrapnel from the tree bursts
hitting the ground all around them. Collo
remembered that they took quite a few
casualties. Pfc James Phillips was ten feet in
front of Collo, on his knees resting against a
large tree. There was a rasping sound coming
from his body. Collo: "He died right there." Pfc
Phillips was had a few days before voluntarily
gone to this platoon to help out when it was
engaged in a firefight while ambushed on patrol.
Together with Tveter he made his way to the
platoon. In the engagement Tveter was wounded
and the platoon sergeant
SSgt Bernard Lojko was killed.
As the infantrymen were establishing their
positions an artillery lieutenant arrived. The
artilleryman was trying to get information on
the location of the German OP. Sgt. McCoy and
the lieutenant proceeded up the mountain seeking
a vantage point from which a visual
reconnaissance for the enemy artillery OP could
be conducted. The two men found a huge rock near
the crest and scaled to the top. They were there
only a few minutes when a 4-man German patrol
filed passed the base of the rock. McCoy then
realized that he had only four rounds in his
rifle. Nevertheless he opened fire and scattered
the patrol. He and the lieutenant quickly
withdrew before the Germans had a chance to
return. When the two returned to where the
Company G men were digging in, the lieutenant
left, going back down the trail along which the
task force had originally come.
Pfc McDermeit and his comrades ate their
single K-ration about noon--it was to be their
last meal for the next couple of days. McDermeit
takes up his story: "After lunch we proceeded
onward and ran into some small arms fire. But we
kept moving forward and heard a yell coming from
in front of us. It was a German soldier, about
45 to 50 years old, who appeared to be starving.
He had been hit in the arm. We took him prisoner
and kept going. Soon we came under machine gun
and mortar fire. We halted. When we tried to
move again we again received fire and took
several casualties--two dead and three or four
wounded. We had taken a medic along with us. He
was busy and would continue to be so in the days
ahead."
Lt. Denton, Weapons Platoon leader, was also
assigned to the task force, although the larger
part of his platoon was with the 2nd Platoon
holding Obenmuehlthal: "The Germans were able to
drop shells on to our positions with surprising
accuracy, and apparently right close to their
own forward observers. Because of the confused
situation and the mixing of our positions with
that of the Germans, communications within our
own task force were every difficult."
As the German shellfire pummeled the troops
sporadically during the afternoon a number of
the men were wounded and several more were
killed. The company commander was paralyzed with
uncertainty--incapable of making a decision or
deciding on a course of action. It was apparent
to all present that the Captain was not able to
command and something had to be done before the
whole unit was wiped out.
Recollections as to exactly what happened
next differ.
Seeing no other way out of the situation,
Sgt. McCoy came to the end of his patience.
Taking the only action left open in order to
save what was left of the unit, he took charge.
The quasi-official unit history, "Ordeal in
the Vosges," by Donald C. Pence and Eugene J.
Petersen, records that after several hours of
being shelled, the company commander called his
platoon leaders together: 2nd Lt. William R.
Taddei, 3rd Platoon leader, McCoy, and Lt.
Denton.
The commander asked the men what they thought
ought to be done about their situation. McCoy
spoke up saying that he thought it was pointless
for them to stay where they were and continue to
take it. He suggested that they establish a
supporting base of fire and assault the area
where the OP, which was directing the shelling,
was suspected to be. McCoy: "When our two
lieutenants nodded their agreement, the company
commander proposed that I plan and direct the
operation. Being only a staff sergeant in the
presence of three officers, I was astounded.
However, they seemed to be sure that was what
they wanted."
Pfc McDermeit recalled the crisis: "While the
official history indicates that Sgt. McCoy had
suggested a plan of operation to the company
commander and two lieutenants, the only officer
present was the Captain. The Captain had tried
constantly for two or three hours to reach
Battalion headquarters by radio. As it was
nearly dark, McCoy became irritated that the
Captain couldn't reach a decision. He finally
told him that he'd give him ten more minutes to
decide what to do or that he (McCoy) would. When
the time limit expired, McCoy told all of us in
a loud voice that from then on we were to take
our orders from him and not from the Captain.
Then he turned to the Captain and told him to
keep his mouth shut. I was 20 years old at the
time and in awe of officers and their power over
enlisted men. I had never heard and enlisted man
raise his voice against an officer."
Second Lt. William A. Darrin, Company G exec:
"I do not recall Sgt McCoy's outburst (not being
present at the time), but I certainly agreed
with his action....the inept handling of the
mission so far by the Captain was very evident."
Pfc Collo also recalled that the Captain had
been trying to get through on the radio and
couldn't make a decision. "We could not stay
where we were so the sergeants made the decision
for the Captain. I believe it was [Sgt] Paul
McCoy and another sergeant that took over."
The company now moved to give back some of
what they had been taking. McCoy told the other
platoon leader to move his men to a position
from which they could bring flanking fire to
bear on the suspected area while he readied the
1st Platoon to make the assault. When he was
sure that the 3rd Platoon was set, he moved his
men forward. The advance took the GIs westward,
diagonally up-slope until they reached the crest
of Schwarzenberg at its west end. Although
McCoy's scout was killed during the assault, the
GIs succeeded in driving off the Germans from
the OP--securing the position around 1600 hours.
With communications out, it was decided to
send a messenger to report that the objective,
the German OP, had been taken. At Muehlthal, the
messenger was ordered to return to the task
force with further instructions. The task force
was directed to move to its next objective--a
hill north of and adjacent to Hill 364. Company
A, 275th, which had been committed on the south
side of the Schwarzenberg, to the left of the
task force, had received instructions to launch
a coordinated assault with the Company G task
force on Hill 364 and the hill to its north. But
Company G never received these orders.
Collo recalled the situation on the hill:
"... at dusk [we] dug in along the crest. While
we were digging in we were hit with another
barrage. The trees in the area were smaller and
a shell hit above the foxhole next to mine. I
was hit in the left rear shoulder. During the
night I ate snow to quench my thirst because the
water in my canteen was frozen solid."
McCoy had ordered the men to circle like a
"wagon train" and dig in. The foxholes, placed
30 to 40 feet apart in the dense forest,
isolated the men so that they were only able to
see the next man on their left and right. During
darkness the troops did not move outside their
holes. Anyone moving about was considered to be
the enemy.
The company continued to take a pounding. Pfc
McDermeit: "In the evening, we were setting
outside our foxholes. I was talking to a guy in
the next foxhole when the shelling began again.
We both jumped for our holes. He was a little
late and a mortar shell cut his arm off above
the elbow. The medic assisted him through the
night, but he died the next morning."
Shortly after midnight, January 11/12,
Colonel Barten, Regimental CO, sent his exec,
Major Bottenfield, and a wire team to
re-establish communications with the Company G
task force. But when over two hours passed
without word from Bottenfield's party, around
0300, Barten decided that he could wait no
longer and summoned Lt. Cruell, leader of the
2nd Bn. Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon. Barten
briefed Cruell on Bottenfield's route and told
him to follow with another patrol. The route ran
directly west from the junction of the
Obermuehlthal and Zinswiller roads, on the slope
north of and parallel to the Obermuehlthal road.
Cruell set out with three men. They had barely
completed the climb up the slope and gone on a
couple of hundred yards when they came across
Bottenfield's party. Bottenfield and his men had
lost their bearings, and, after several hours,
had come across their own phone wire--they had
been circling. The two groups returned together
to the Muehlthal CP.
Barten now told Cruell to take a patrol,
along with a wire crew, and try again to find
Company G, determine its status, and establish
wire communications. Cruell took three A&P
Platoon members and two wire crewmen. He first
took his party to Obermuehlthal. There they
found several members of the 2nd Platoon,
Company G, and discussed the probable location
of the balance of the company. Nobody knew
anything for certain. It was thought that they
had last been moving west on the other side of
the mountain. It was now shortly before dawn.
One of the men from the 2nd Platoon agreed to
guide Cruell's party part of the way in their
search. They proceeded through Obermuehlthal,
turned north and climbed up and over the
saddleback ridge. Their guide gave them
directions and then returned to Obermuehlthal.
Cruell's patrol headed west along the north
slope of the Schwarzenberg, observing in the dim
light at daybreak the valley on their right and
the ridge on the far side of it. As they
approached the mouth of the valley the sounds of
small arms and mortar fire could be heard coming
from up ahead, but seemed to die away as they
grew near. Along their route of march they came
upon signs of Company G's passing and a sense of
its ordeal--shatter trees, shell craters, and
bodies of GIs. As they continued west they
climbed higher until they were well up the slope
of the Schwarzenberg.
They had advanced a couple of hundred yards
after the sound of firing had ceased when, close
to the crest of the mountain where the Company G
group had bivouacked the night before, they came
face to face with seven grim looking GIs. The
men identified themselves as the rear guard of
the Company G task force. They appeared jumpy
and had ahnost fired on Cruell's party. They may
have done just that had not Lt. Denton, Weapons
Platoon leader, not recognized Lt. Cruell.
Cruell: "Denton wanted to know where in the hell
we had come from and how we had gotten through.
I didn't understand and answered we hadn't had
any trouble. When I asked why we should have had
trouble, Denton explained that he and his men
had repelled a German attack only five minutes
before, an attack that had come from the
identical direction of my patrol's approach. No
wonder they had been so ready to fire on us!"
Cruell explained the patrol's mission to
Denton--to find the task force, get the
telephone wire to them, and check with the CO
about his force's situation. Denton informed
Cruell that he (Denton) would get word to the CO
that Cruell had been there (that he had talked
to Cruell) and then he insisted that Cruell take
his men and leave the area at once, asking that
Cruell take with them one of Denton's men who
had seriously wounded. Denton also told Cruell
that the unit had only about 25 men left--having
lost 50 percent of the original force in a
24-hour period. Cruell tried to persuade Denton
that he should proceed on to the company's
position, but Denton would see things no other
way. So Cruell left the wire, took his men and
the wounded litter case, and started back.
Cruell would conclude later, regarding Denton's
attitude, that Denton may have been under orders
from his CO to prevent any non-essential troop
movement, since they might attract enemy fire,
given that German mortar and artillery shelling
had already inflicted serious losses on the
Company G task force.
Lt. Denton: "We were shelled and harassed by
mortars, I don't think that the Germans had
artillery up there, but the mortars were heavy
[large caliber]. They seemed to have outposts
all around and could drop the shells right up to
their own positions. I didn't know much about
what was going on with the main body because I
was in charge of the rear guard. I was afraid
that the Germans would use the wire that Cruell
had brought up to pinpoint our position."
The return trip was not without its
difficulties. Cruell's men hadn't gone more than
a hundred yards they were hit with mortar,
artillery, and small arms fire. Cruell: "The
incoming shells were causing tree-bursts all
around us. It probably took us a little over an
hour to reach the saddle above Obermuehlthal,
but it seemed to take ages... It was a miracle
that none of us was even wounded. We dove for
cover repeatedly as we heard the sound of an
approaching shell--behind fallen trees or even a
corpse or two when no other shelter was handy.
As we moved through trees, we could hear and see
shell fragments plugging into nearby tree
trunks."
Pfc Collo takes up his story back at the
Company G position: "The next morning they
decided to send the walking wounded back to
headquarters. One of the wounded had died during
the night from loss of blood and the cold. The
group consisted of a sergeant, a prisoner
[probably the old German captured the previous
day], and five or six armed, but wounded
soldiers. The sergeant led off with the
prisoner. I followed two or three paces behind
him. In a short while we were hit by small arms
fire on our left flank. We were caught in an
open area with only one tree large enough to
provide cover, and the German prisoner was
crouched behind that. During the firefight he
kept glancing at me. I think he was afraid that
I would shoot him. At the sound of gun fire I
had dropped to the ground. I was behind a tree
that was only about 6-inches in diameter. Pfc
William Manser, our wounded BAR-man, was to my
left front. He was on one knee trying to get his
frozen gun to operate. He died trying." (For a
picture of William Manser, go the page of
SSgt Bernard Lojko)
"I spotted a German in a white parka with a
black beard advancing on our position moving
from tree to tree. They (the Germans) were in an
area with large trees. Whenever he stuck his
head out from behind a tree, I aimed and fired,
but he did not react. After firing several [what
I thought were] well aimed, but unsuccessful
shots, I concluded [that] my sights were off and
even tried hitting the tree to see where the gun
was firing. Meanwhile, the German I was shooting
at was getting closer. I fired a whole clip
without success. When I went to reload another
clip it came apart and the bullets fell into the
rifle's receiver. I had to get on my left elbow
to turn the rifle over and shake the loose
shells out. They all came out, but one, [which]
I managed to feed into the chamber. I fired
again and the German dropped flat on the ground
and crawled quickly away. The firing in the area
stopped after I fired the last shot."
"Soon after the firing stopped three soldiers
from headquarters joined us. I believe they
scared the Germans away. The survivors--myself,
the German prisoner, and the sergeant, who was
shot in the shoulder during the attack--returned
with the three to the 2nd Battalion aid
station."
Lt. Denton: "The next morning we were
receiving more shell fire onto our positions. At
one point the shelling had stopped and word was
passed down the line to us to move on out. As we
got to our feet, I heard the whistle of a shell
coming in and threw myself to the ground. A man
on either side of me was struck by shell
fragments and killed."
"Some time the same morning Sergeant McCoy
got word to me that our Captain had totally
withdrawn himself and was unable to provide any
leadership. McCoy stated that he had decided to
step in and take control, but suggested that I
could take over command if that was what I
wanted. At this point, I told him to carry on
since I felt that he had the support of his
entire platoon, had a better feeling for our
situation, and could provide the leadership that
was needed to get us out of a very bad
position."
Lt. Darrin recalled that on the morning of 12
January the Captain [apparently now back in
charge] decided to send a patrol back to report
the unit's situation to headquarters and to get
rations and ammunition. The Captain initially
assigned acting 1st Sgt. Arnold Hawvermale [or
Hawvermill], the communications sergeant, to the
patrol. Hawvermale had only been made First
Sergeant a few days before by Lt. Darrin as the
unit was being moved from the Rhine. Darrin and
Hawvermale were each expecting the birth of
their first child and had been discussing
fatherhood just before going into action. Lt.
Darrin objected strenuously to placing the
patrol under an NCO, feeling that a commissioned
officer's report would be taken more seriously,
and given the hazardous nature of the
assignment. So Lt. Darrin was assigned to go
with the patrol.
The patrol had just started out when they
began to receive fire from their front. Sgt.
Hawvermale was caught in the first volley and
killed with a slug in the head. As they hit the
ground they also began taking fire from the
rear. Returning fire they succeeded in driving
off a small German patrol.
Besides Hawvermale, two other men had been
killed and several were wounded, including Lt.
Darrin. All of the other wounded could walk, but
Darrin had been hit in the ankle. Two of the GIs
tried to carry him, but it was obviously he was
going to delay the patrol, so he told them to
leave and send a stretcher back for him.[3]
The exact circumstances of Cpl Guilbault's death
are not known but it is assumed he died in the
actions described above.
Corporal