In March of
1945 the division found itself near Gladbeck in
Germany. Gladbeck is located to the Northwest of
Gelsenkirchen.
The 134th
Regimental History writes the following about
the action of late March:
"With the hope
of achieving a break-out on the plains of
northern Germany, General Eisenhower had decided
that the main effort in crossing the Rhine
should be made north of the Ruhr, that is, in
the area of Field Marshall Sir Bernard L.
Montgomery’s Northern (21st) Group of Armies. In
a great windfall of the war, however, troops of
General Courtney Hodges’ First Army (the 9th
Armored Division) had seized intact the
Ludendorff Bridge at Remagen, and before the
main effort could be mounted in the north, First
Army already had developed a bridgehead 25 miles
long and 10 miles deep, and its three corps were
ready to strike out. This major threat to the
Germans in that region south of the Ruhr lent a
considerable assurance of success to the big
attack of the British, Canadian, and U.S. Ninth
Armies in the north (in Operation PLUNDER) when
the great air fleets of the First Allied
Airborne Army and the waves of boats - operated
mostly by naval personnel - began crossing the
great barrier early on 24 March, 1945.
At a meeting at
the Regimental C.P. that morning Colonel
Boatsman reported the progress of the operation
and announced plans for the Regiment’s
participation in it. Two British corps had
attacked at midnight, and Commandos were now
taking Wesel. At 0200 the 30th (U.S.) Division
had begun crossing at three sites in the area
south of Wesel, and by 0400 six battalions were
across, and now they had penetrated to a depth
of 2,000 yards. An hour later troops of the 79th
Division had begun crossing some distance to the
right (south) of the 30th, and by 0400 it had
three battalions across and likewise had
achieved a penetration of 2,000 yards.
Opposition had been surprisingly light.
A quartering
party left with Captain Lysle Abbott in
mid-morning to reconnoiter an assembly area near
Rheinberg, and the Regiment was alerted to be
prepared to move on 30 minutes notice after
1700. (Earlier plans had contemplated use of the
35th Division to exploit a breakthrough no
earlier than D plus 4.) Later orders indicated
that there would be no movement toward the
bridgehead until the next day.
Task Force
Miltonberger was attached to the 79th Division
for the operation. The task force included, in
addition to the 134th Infantry, the 161st and
127th Field Artillery Battalions; Company A,
784th Tank Battalion; Company A, 654th Tank
Destroyer Battalion, Company A, 60th Engineer
Battalion, and Company A, 110th Medical
Battalion.
Soon after
arrival of the Regiment in the Rheinberg area,
where the line companies detrucked, orders came
for an immediate crossing of the river. Night
was falling as the 3rd, 1st, 2nd Battalions
marched across the great pontoon "Love" bridge
at "Blue" beach, and even the night sky assumed
a look similar to that of the first night in
Normandy when airplanes of the Luftwaffe
exchanged colorful streams of tracers with
anti-aircraft guns near the bridge.
Completion of
plans, coordination with units of 153rd Infantry
(79th Division), issuance of orders in all
echelons, movement into position - all these
consumed most of the night, but the battalions,
the 3rd on the right and the 2nd on the left,
jumped off on time at 0800. Line of departure
was the front of the 315th Infantry, and after
that area had been cleared, the 79th Division
turned generally southeast to protect the right
flank of the XVI Corps. Although the Regiment
was going into the industrial Ruhr region, this
first day’s attack was mainly through patches of
woods. Opposition - primarily from direct fire
of 20mm and larger caliber SP guns - was
somewhat more pronounced in front of the 3rd
Battalion, and these same centers of resistance
held up to a similar pace the 2nd Battalion’s
right - G Company. Company E, however, advanced
rapidly from the first. Further delay came to
the 3rd Battalion when its attached tanks bogged
down in the mud of an autobahn roadbed which was
under construction. (Tanks attached to the 1st
Battalion, in reserve, were sent forward to the
3rd.) By 1430, both battalions were on the task
force objective, and the 3rd Battalion had
seized a bridge intact over the Schwartzer
creek.
With arrival of
the remainder of the 35th Division east of the
river, Task Force Miltonberger was dissolved at
1800, and CT 134 reverted to division control.
The 137th Infantry came into the line on the
right, and the two regiments prepared to launch
a coordinated attack at 0600 on the 27th.
As far as the
134th was concerned, there was something of a
shift in emphasis in enemy opposition. Woods
were even more prominent in the terrain now, and
it was deep within the timberland that the 3rd
Battalion met its first center of resistance. A
vigorous fire fight on the part of Company I
eliminated that, and by 0900 the battalion,
after an advance of about 3,500 yards from the
line of departure, had debauched from the woods
(Forst Wesel) to arrive at the first phase line,
designated "Able." A major problem here was the
resupply of ammunition to replace that expended
in the woods. Spring had come to the Ruhr on
time, and winter’s snows were gone, but thaw and
spring rains had made the trails through the
woods impassable for any wheeled vehicles. Once
again M-29 carriers (weasels) provided the
solution until an alternate route could be
found. This done, Company K moved up abreast of
Company I to follow a parallel route on the left
toward new objectives - another 3,000 yards to
the east - by 1450.
It was in front
of the 2nd Battalion that opposition - still
characterized by direct-fire cannon and
anti-aircraft guns - developed strongest. When
the 3rd Battalion forged ahead on the right, the
possibility of an enveloping action against the
right flank suggested itself. Men of E Company
mounted attached tanks and TD’s, and, swinging
down through the zone of the 3rd Battalion, hit
the rear of the enemy positions. This assisted
toward some advance, but in the afternoon new
troubles appeared. First there were a pair of
German tanks camouflaged as haystacks, and when
they withdrew, assault guns, supplemented by
mortars and small arms, took their place. Now
that battalion was deployed on a two-company
front, with F on the right and E on the left,
and G closely following E.
Visiting the
regimental C.P. at 1500, the division commander
ordered the Regiment to reach phase line "Uncle"
(a railway cutting across the front) by night.
At this point the 3rd Battalion was at least
1,200 yards from that goal - with some threat of
counterattack, and the 2nd was nearer 4,000
yards away. To accomplish this mission it would
mean for the 2nd Battalion a greater advance in
two hours (and there were no immediate signs of
any diminishing trend in opposition) than had
been battered out the whole day. Colonel
McDannel committed his reserve company (G) on
the left and shifted E somewhat to the right in
order to bring all possible firepower against
the enemy.
A new potential
threat appeared shortly after General Baade
issued his order for continuation of the attack.
The 137th Infantry had been having considerable
difficulty advancing along the autobahn
(Hitler’s super highway) on the right, and, as a
result of the 3rd Battalion’s rapid advance, an
important gap in depth now existed between the
forward elements of the two regiments. A call
from the 137th at 1520 warned that a group of
about 75 enemy infantrymen had been flushed out,
and were withdrawing to the northeast - toward
the rear of the 3rd Battalion.
As darkness
threatened to overtake the whole operation,
Colonel Boatsman decided to shift his troops in
a final effort to reach the objective. He
committed Major Davis’ 1st Battalion, in reserve
so far, on the right, with a mission of
maintaining contact with the 137th - which
required a considerable extension of that
battalion; and he directed Colonel Wood to renew
the attack to the northeast with the 3rd
Battalion - into the zone of the 2nd. The 2nd
Battalion had gained another kilometer by 1700,
and then orders came to halt the attack at 1800.
Confidant that, with these dispositions, the
Regiment could reach the objective, and
convinced that it would be an easier task to
accomplish now than after the enemy had been
given further opportunity for consolidation, the
regimental commander asked permission to
continue the attack after dark. On resumption of
the attack at 2000, one of the Tanks of Company
E was knocked out, and there still was 20mm and
SP gun fire. But a platoon of Company K attained
a patch of woods near the railway, and then
other elements of the 3rd Battalion moved up to
occupy the objective before midnight.
Attacks during
the next day (28 March) were aimed at clearing
pockets of resistance which remained in front of
the 2nd and 1st Battalions. With the 2nd
advancing again on the left, the 3rd now turned
back toward the southeast as Company I attempted
to neutralize some of the serious opposition
which had developed in front of the 1st, but it
was unable to cross the railroad. Areas of
opposition which were proving so troublesome for
the 137th were becoming thorns in the side of
the 134th, and it was fire from that area
(around Bottrop) that was giving the 1st
Battalion much of its difficulty.
It doubtless
would be hard for most infantrymen to say which
was the more eerie experience, an attack at
night through enemy-infested woods, or an attack
at night through the streets of a large enemy
city. Men of the 134th Infantry had an
opportunity to make such a comparison in the
Ruhr. First major urban objective for the
Regiment in the urban Ruhr area was the city of
Gladbeck (peace time population: 61,000), and at
2100 that same night long columns of the 3rd and
2nd Battalions moved down through a railway
overpass, and then out into "no-man’s" land over
the blacktop highway. A few aroused Germans
delayed the advance with some small arms fire,
and the difficulty of restoring control in the
leading companies after a night fire fight
delayed it some more, but well before morning
both battalions were in good positions in the
smaller section of the city which lay to the
west of the first main railway."
The After
Action Report of the 134th Regiment for March
28, 1945 says:
"At0600, the
attack was resumed, with the First Battalion
advancing northeast, meeting moderate artillery
fire and some direct fire from self-propelled
guns, developing into heavy small arms and
machine gun fire as the unit approached the
railroad tracks in the vicinity of 442299. Heavy
enemy small arms, final-protective-line fires,
originating in the zone of the regiment on the
right, denied the crossing of this railroad at
the end of the period. Resuming the attack at
0600 with Company F on the right and Companies E
and G in colomn echeloned left rear, the second
Battalion advanced another one and a half
kilometers. Opposition consisted of direct fire
from self-propelled guns and 20mm fire, with
small arms fire increasing as the units
approached the railroad. After having cleared
the area in the vicinity of 440320, the Third
Battalion attacked with Company I through the
woods to the southeast in an effort to reach the
railroad as assist the advance of the First
Battalion, but by the end of the afternoon's
advance had been unable to cross this line.
Heavy concentrations of artillery fire, followed
by heavy small arms fire were received in the
First Battalion zone. It was felt that this was
intended to be the build-up for a counterattack,
but if such was the case, it was broken up by
supporting artillery fire before it could hit
the position. At 2100, the Second and Third
Battalions, in colomn of companies, battalions
abreast, again attacked, securing positions of
the railroad west of Gladbeck."
Pfc Moss was
killed on March 28, 1945 in the fight for the
railway near Gladbach.
He
is buried at Margraten American Military
Cemetery, Plot E Row 18 Grave 23.
(Picture courtesy
of Mr. Jim Moss)
Private
First Class